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Sociologists have long emphasized the crucial role that interpersonal relationships play in
the life and professional success of individuals and groups (e.g., Coleman (1988), Granovetter
(1985), Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993)). In recent years, economists too have begun to
recognize that economic exchange is inﬂuenced by the level of familiarity and trust that exists
between agents (e.g., Gambetta (1988), Fukuyama (1995), Greif (1993, 1994), Platteau (1994),
Fafchamps (1998), Tadelis (1998)). In a world characterized by imperfect information and
enforcement, it has been shown both theoretically and empirically that personalized relationships
can facilitate the circulation of information on new technologies (e.g, Barr (1997)) and market
opportunities (e.g, Kranton (1996)), the screening of job and credit applicants (e.g, Montgomery
(1991), Cornell and Welch (1996)), the sharing of risk (e.g., Fafchamps (1992), Coate and Raval-
lion (1993), Lund and Fafchamps (1997)), and the punishment of cheaters (e.g., Kandori (1992),
Fafchamps (1998)). Much of this work remains conﬁned to markets such as credit or labor in
which moral hazard issues are severe. Applications to markets for commodities have so far been
few (see, however, Gabre-Madhin (1997), Kranton (1996), Bernstein (1996)). The present paper
ﬁlls this lacuna by documenting the role that personal relationships play in the trade of agricul-
tural products.
This paper presents original evidence on the extent to which relationships are used by agri-
cultural traders in Madagascar to serve a variety of purposes such as: the circulation of informa-
tion about prices and market conditions; the provision of trade credit; the prevention and han-
dling of contractual difﬁculties; the regularity of trade ﬂows; and the mitigation of risk. Results
show that larger and more prosperous traders are those with better relationships. The fact that
larger, more successful traders are better connected will hardly surprise anyone who is familiar
with African trade patterns (e.g., Bauer (1954), Jones (1959, 1972), Meillassoux (1971), Cohen
(1969), Amselle (1977)). It is also in line with the new literature on social capital that identiﬁes
networks of relationships as a productive asset from which individuals can derive a return. But it3 
runs somewhat contrary to the expectation of policy makers and international agencies who often
implicitly assume that larger traders are more sophisticated and that sophistication is
synonymous to arms-length, anonymous exchange.
This is important because the common observations that large traders cultivate close rela-
tionships with each other is often interpreted as evidence of collusion and price rigging.
Although we cannot comment directly on whether or not collusion is present in Madagascar
grain markets, our results indicate that there are many other reasons why traders maintain a net-
work of personal relations, such as access to information, regular trade ﬂows, trade credit, and
risk sharing. Our results also indicate that traders with better networks have higher margins and
thus that they derive a return from their social capital. Although these results must be conﬁrmed
by a more rigorous analysis, they suggest that large traders make more proﬁt than their smaller
competitors not necessarily because they abuse their market power but because their connections
make them more efﬁcient.
If correct, our analysis implies that governments and politicians should refrain from the
temptation of blaming successful traders for the economic difﬁculties of a country. This has too
often been done in the past2 and is still very much practiced, as the plight of ethnic Chinese
traders in Indonesia reminded us only recently. Efforts to increase competition should focus on
reducing the difference between the margins of large and small traders. This should not be
accomplished by destroying the social capital of large traders since this eliminates a productive
asset and thereby reduces social welfare. Rather, increased competition should be sought by
eliminating market imperfections, increasing the ﬂuidity of trade, and thus reducing the need for
network capital. If this proves to be too difﬁcult, more competition must be sought by raising the
social capital of small traders -- for instance raised by improving trust and deterring fraud in
________________
2 "Indo-Pakistani traders [] bore the brunt of Malagasy violence in the 1987 riots. [T]he Indian premises on either
sides [of the main street in Tulear] along with most of the central area were gutted" (see Lonely Planet (1994), p.220).4 
commercial relations. Keeping agricultural trade in a state of lawless marginality under the con-
stant suspicion of political authorities only favors mistrust and encourages crooks. It does not
foster a competitive environment. Competition can also be encouraged by lowering the market
imperfections that generate large returns to personal relationships. For example, accurate infor-
mation about prices and market conditions can be circulated on the radio to complement the
information that circulates informally among traders. The risk faced by traders -- and thus the
need to seek insurance through friends and relatives -- can be reduced by increasing road security
and deterring theft. These issues deserve more research.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 1 with a brief description of the
agricultural markets policies of the Malagasy government since independence. We also provide a
rapid survey of the existing literature on agricultural markets in Madagascar, most notably the
work of Barrett (1997a, 1997b). We then describe in Section 2 the data used in this paper and the
survey methodology used to collect them. A characterization of agricultural traders is provided in
Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the different functions performed by rela-
tionships. Conclusions and prospects for future work are presented at the end.
Section 1. Agricultural Markets in Madagascar
After Madagascar obtained independence from France, governments initially increased the
intervention of the state in agricultural markets (e.g., Dorosh and Bernier (1994), Shuttleworth
(1989), Berg (1989)). By the end of the 1970’s, most trade in agricultural products was in the
hands of the state. A reversal of policy took place in the 1980’s with a transition from a state food
marketing system to a liberalized market. This transition, however, was very gradual.
It begun in 1983 when the state ofﬁcially abandoned its monopoly on the commerce of agri-
cultural products. The initial liberalization measures implied that agricultural trading was open to
everybody except in the plains of Marovoay and Lac Aloatra - two main production areas -
where two government agencies, FIFABE and SOMALAC, could continue their monopoly. The5 
roles of these two state companies were only redesigned in 1989. In the beginning of the reforms,
ﬂoor and ceiling prices were maintained in effect. In June 1985 a government decree ﬁxed the
ﬂoor price of paddy while removing the ceiling price completely. But in reality the government
effectively controlled domestic rice trade until 1986. From mid 1983 on they supplied all the big
cities with the "riz fokontany", i.e. subsidized rice. In Antananarivo this type of rice represented
until 1986 more than 60% of the average household consumption in rice (e.g., Roubaud (1997)).
This program continued until October 1988 but its importance declined gradually.
In November 1986, the government introduced a buffer stock scheme in response to high
seasonal prices during that year and to defend the ceiling price. However, the buffer stock
scheme was poorly administered and was ultimately terminated in 1990. In 1991, the government
introduced an import tax of 30% on rice to protect local production. This tax was reduced in 1995
to 10%. However, occasionally the government granted tax exoneration for certain companies
and shipments to assure a steady food supply.
The current situation can be described as one in which private traders have been given free
reign to set buying and selling prices and to move agricultural products around the country. The
state continues to intervene in agricultural markets through buying and selling operations con-
ducted for example by SOMACODIS but these agencies now only represent a very small percen-
tage of the total volume of food products transacted domestically. In this respect Madagascar
resembles many other African countries that have gone through a similar cycle of government
interventionism and retreat (e.g., Berg (1989), Staatz, Dione and Dembele (1989), Gabre-Madhin
(1997)).
Trade in agricultural products in Madagascar has been analyzed by other authors, most not-
ably Barrett (1997a, 1997b) and Berg (1989). Agricultural food products ﬂow mostly from rural
areas to urban centers immediately after harvest, and from urban centers to rural areas in the lean
period. Although the capital city Antananarivo occasionally draws food products from outside its6 
own province (faritany), most marketed output is consumed within the province where it is pro-
duced (e.g., Minten et al. (1997)). Barrett and Dorosh (1996) show that most Malagasy rural
households are deﬁcit rice producers and must rely on the market for their subsistence. Food
markets are thus important not only for urban dwellers but for rural inhabitants as well. Using
surveys of Malagasy grain traders, Barrett (1997a) describes agricultural trade in the country as
characterized by extreme disparity between large and small traders. He argues that most traders
do not have access to the equipment and credit required to penetrate the more proﬁtable segments
of the business. As a result, most trading businesses remain small while a few large traders derive
large margins in activities that are secluded from competition. Only in segments where entry is
easy is competition ﬁerce. A similar conclusion is reached by Abt Associates (1991) and
Kristjanson and Martin (1991). Barrett concludes his work by calling for easier and wider access
to credit for traders.
Section 2. Survey Methodology
Although the work of Barrett and others provides much needed detailed information on
agricultural markets in Madagascar, it largely ignores issues of social capital and personal rela-
tionships. To ﬁll this lacuna, a survey of agricultural traders was conducted in Madagascar in a
joint project between IFPRI (the International Food Policy Research Institute) and the local Min-
istry of Scientiﬁc Research (FOFIFA). The survey consisted of two rounds. The ﬁrst round was
held between May 1997 and August 1997. The questionnaire in the ﬁrst round survey consisted
mainly of questions dealing with the individual characteristics of the traders and with the struc-
ture, conduct, and performance of the trading sector. The second survey round was conducted
between September 1997 and November 1997. The same traders were visited and they were
asked mostly about the nature of their relationships with other traders, clients, and suppliers.
The sample design was constructed so as to be as representative as possible of all the
traders involved in the whole food marketing chain from producer to consumer, wherever7 
located. Three main agricultural regions were covered (Fianarantsoa, Majunga, and
Antananarivo) and the sampling frame within these regions was set up as follows. Traders were
surveyed in three different types of location:
(1) Traders operating in big and small urban markets in the main town of every province (fari-
tany) and district (ﬁvondronana). These traders are mostly wholesalers, semi-wholesalers,
and retailers.
(2) Urban traders located outside the regular markets. These often are bigger traders, processors
(e.g., rice millers), and wholesalers.
(3) Traders operating on rural markets at the level of the rural county (ﬁraisana). These are
mostly big and small assemblers and itinerant traders. Rural ﬁraisanas were selected through
stratiﬁed sampling based on agro-ecological characteristics so as to be representative of the
various kind of marketed products and marketing seasons.
The survey focused on traders that marketed locally consumed staples such as rice, cas-
sava, potatoes, beans, and peanuts. The different forms in which these products are marketed
were taken into consideration, i.e., paddy and milled rice, maize and maize ﬂour, etc. Traders
involved primarily in export crops, fruits, vegetables, and minor crops were excluded. Most sur-
veyed traders -- 67% -- report rice as the agricultural product they trade most intensively. This
reﬂects the importance of rice as the main staple food in the country. Other most actively traded
products are beans and lentils (18% of the sample report them as their main traded product), cas-
sava (5%), potatoes (5%), peanuts (4%), and maize (2%).
A total number of 850 traders were surveyed in the ﬁrst round, 739 of whom were surveyed
again in the second round. To facilitate comparison, the analysis presented here is based on
traders that could be located in the two rounds.3 The three provinces of Antananarivo,
________________
3 Not surprisingly, the category of traders which were hardest to trace during the second survey round are those
who are least formal and have the least permanent form of operation. As a result, small itinerant traders tend to be
underrepresented in the results reported here.8 
Fianarantsoa, and Majunga are represented more or less equally in the sample. A breakdown of
the sample by size and occupational category is given in Table 1. Size categories are deﬁned
based on the total value of reported annual sales; occupational categories are based on the occu-
pation of the respondent for the main traded crop at harvest time.4
The Table shows that retailers constitute the bulk of the sample. They are divided into
retailers with a semi-permanent selling point -- usually a stall in the market itself; and retailers
without ﬁxed selling point, that is, those who sell immediately from the roadside. As the Table
shows, the latter are typically smaller and less formal.5 In contrast, the largest traders are assem-
blers (traders who collect large quantities from the countryside and assemble them for shipment)
and wholesalers (traders who operate in bulk). Having described the survey methodology, we are
now ready to proceed with the analysis. We begin with a brief characterization of surveyed
traders.
Section 3. A Brief Characterization of Agricultural Traders
Surveyed traders vary widely in the size of their operations. The total sales of the average
trader amount to almost $3,300 a month6 but there is enormous variation across traders: the Gini
coefﬁcient of total sales computed over the sample is 0.761 (Table 2). Similar results are obtained
if we consider purchases or if we restrict ourselves to sales during the month preceding the
second round interview. Size is correlated with occupational category: assemblers and
wholesalers have the largest monthly turnover at $8,700 and $5,550, respectively; retailers have
the smallest -- $1,300 and $400 for those with and without ﬁxed selling point, respectively. These
results are similar to those reported by Barrett (1997a) in his study of agricultural markets in
________________
4 The deﬁnition of occupational categories is indeed complicated by the fact that traders who are semi-wholesalers
for one product can be retailer for another. Traders may also change occupational category during the year, e.g., they
may be assembler during the harvest season but semi-wholesalers the rest of the year.
5 Because their ﬂuid nature makes them harder to trade, they are underrepresented in the second survey round.
6 Sales of listed staple food products over the period April 1996 to March 1997; conversion into US$ using an
approximate exchange rate of 5,000 Francs Malgaches for US$1.9 
Madagascar. To reﬂect variation in size, in much of the presentation that follows we divide the
sample into three terciles called ’small’, ’medium’, and ’large’, respectively. The data also indi-
cates that trade in agricultural food products is a highly seasonal activity: monthly sales in the
lean October period only amount to 40% of average annual sales. This is due to the highly sea-
sonal nature of agricultural production and the relative lack of in-village storage (e.g., IFPRI
(1998)). Most assembly takes place after harvest in April and May, which explains why the
difference between annual averages and October sales is widest for assemblers. In contrast, retail
where small traders dominate is less seasonal in nature since consumption takes place throughout
the year.
Next, we investigate whether the proﬁtability of traders varies systematically with size.
Gross margins are computed as the difference between total annual sales and purchases. Results
provide an order of magnitude of the total payments to labor, management, and equipment, but
they are subject to a lot of measurement error.7 On average, gross margins amount to $460 a
month -- signiﬁcantly higher than the average GDP per head of $230 per year (e.g.,
The World Bank (1997)).8 Assemblers have the highest gross margin -- $1800 a month --
retailers without table the lowest -- $70. In percentage terms, the average gross margin is 14% --
19% among assemblers, 14% among wholesalers, 10% to 16% among retailers. There does not
seem to be a systematic relationship between ﬁrm size and gross margin rate.
________________
7 First, certain traders are hesitant to communicate their effective proﬁt margin to outsiders and seek to disguise the
volume of their activities. This generates inconsistencies in reported sales and purchases, e.g., medium size traders
report higher average annual purchases than sales in Table 2. Second, very few traders keep an accurate accounting of
their sales and purchases over the year (if only for fear of taxation). As a result, they easily forget how much and at
which price they actually bought and sold products. Finally, we suspect that certain traders actually do not know how
much they sold and bought as trading happens on an ad hoc basis. This is particularly true for small traders who
seldom make a clear distinction between their production, consumption, and trade in agricultural products.
8 To minimize errors due to inconsistencies between sales and purchases, gross margins were computed as follows.
For each product, a gross margin was computed by multiplying quantities sold by the difference between sales and
purchase price; adding the result over all products yields a gross margin estimate based on quantities sold. An
alternative gross margin estimate was constructed using quantities purchased instead. The gross margin ﬁgures
reported in Table 2 are the average of the two.10 
Capital and Labor
We now examine in detail the capital and labor structure of surveyed ﬁrms before turning to
the human capital and family background of respondent traders. Working capital comes mostly
from own sources, not from credit: 89% of the traders rely exclusively on their own funds for
their business activities. The average working capital is US$2,060 -- roughly two thirds of aver-
age monthly sales (Table 3). Not only do larger traders have more working capital than small
ones, they also appear to rotate it faster: the ratio between working capital and monthly sales
indeed falls with ﬁrm size, i.e., from 1.7 among small traders to 0.9 among medium size traders
and to 0.6 among large traders. Although most of the traders rely on own funds to ﬁnance their
operations, 81% estimates that these funds are not sufﬁcient and they would like to see their
funds increase threefold.
Formal credit as a mean to ﬁnance trading activities is almost non-existent: it is mentioned
by only 1.5% of the traders representing 6.1% of total sales. The minor importance of formal
ﬁnancial institutions is further illustrated by the fact that only 16% of the surveyed traders have a
bank account; one trader out of 100 has a bank line of credit. Only 4% of the traders has ever
asked for credit from a formal institution. When asked why they do not apply for formal credit,
half of the traders respond either that they do not know how to apply (28%) or that the applica-
tion procedure is too complicated (19%). The rest either consider the interest rate too high (23%)
or or do not possess any collateral (16%). As is often the case in surveys of this type (e.g.,
Cuevas et al. (1993), Fafchamps et al. (1994), Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995)), we
observe a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and reliance on formal ﬁnancial institutions.
Informal credit does not appear to compensate for the limited use of formal credit. Only one
trader out of ten derives part of its working capital from informal credit sources. Less than 2% of
the traders are members of savings mutuals; only 1% are member of a "tontine" (a rotating sav-
ings group). The use of trade credit is also very limited, as we shall discuss more in detail in Sec-11 
tion 4. The median self-declared opportunity cost of capital reverts around 20% a year; some
respondents declare facing a much higher shadow cost of capital, however. There is no clear rela-
tionship between size and the shadow interest rate perceived by traders.
The level of the equipment at the disposal of traders is very limited, even among large
traders. The only piece of equipment that is nearly universal is the balance, which is owned by
79% of the surveyed traders. Half of the traders own a location that they use for storage -- typi-
cally the shop itself or a small warehouse. Less than one trader out of ten -- one out of three
among large traders -- owns a vehicle for transportation purposes. The total equipment owned by
traders is worth less than one ﬁfth of their working capital; most trader capital is thus tied up in
stocks and receivables.
Malagasy traders have imperfect access to modern means of communication. The great
majority of traders (95%) do not have a telephone for their business; virtually none has a fax
machine. Even among bigger traders, only 11.5% declare having a phone. Half of the surveyed
traders nevertheless have access to a phone, but few avail themselves of this opportunity in the
conduct of their business. The use of fax machines for trade purposes is virtually non-existent.
In terms of management experience, surveyed traders have on average spent 6 years trading
in agricultural products. The average starting date is 1991, six years before the survey, but
signiﬁcantly later than the onset of agricultural trade liberalization (1983-1987) (see Section 1).
The link with the previous state marketing system is minimal: only 2% of respondents ever were
employed in the state marketing system. Large traders are slightly more experienced than small
traders, but the difference is not very large.
The majority of surveyed traders operate all year round and focus most of their attention on
trade, with no noticeable difference by ﬁrm size. Some 14% of the small traders list agriculture as
their main activity while some of the bigger traders declare transformation, transport, or agricul-
ture as their main source of income. As a secondary activity, farming remains important: 69% of12 
surveyed traders participate, in one way or another, in agriculture. In addition, 16% of the
respondents participate in non-farm activities, 17% obtain a regular salary, and 11% have a regu-
lar source of income other than earned income. Only 40% of the respondents (half of the small
traders) derive all their income from agricultural trading.
Malagasy traders employ very few people other than themselves (Table 3) -- on average,
one unpaid family helper, one permanent employee, and a little over one casual worker. Small
and medium size traders have almost no external help in their business and they seem to do most
of the trading on their own or with the help of family members. Large traders make more use of
permanent and temporary employees and may also use the services of collecting agents. Judging
from the number of months in a year than different categories of trade workers spend participat-
ing to the activities of the ﬁrm, temporary employees work about half the year while all other
categories work close to full time. While one observes a positive relationship between employ-
ment and total sales, the relationship is far from being proportional. In other words, large traders
have a much higher volume of activity per worker than small traders. Since they also use less
working capital per volume of sales than small traders, they appear to be more efﬁcient overall.
Section 4 investigates whether relationships may account for part of the performance differential
between small and large traders.
Human capital and family background
Turning to the personal characteristics and human capital of the owners (Table 4), we see
that close to half the surveyed traders are female; the proportion of women is much higher among
small than large ﬁrms, however. Large ﬁrms also tend to have a slightly older owner, but the
difference is not large. Surveyed traders are, on average, well educated, having spent on average
9 years in school. At ﬁrst glance, there appears to be little difference across ﬁrm size terciles but
this is partly incorrect. Among the small traders, 11 % are not able to read or write. Morover,
while 46% of the big traders ﬁnished at least secondary school, this percentage is only 15% for13 
the small traders. Small traders are also more likely to identify with traditional religions and
identify themselves as non-Christian, the dominant religion on the island. Other religious
afﬁliations are extremely rare. The overwhelming majority of the surveyed traders were born in
the country and are ethnically Malagasy. Unlike in other parts of Africa (e.g., Fafchamps (1998)),
the ethnic and religious make-up of the trading community is thus fairly homogeneous.9
Unlike much of the African mainland, Malagasy people share a common language which is
spoken throughout the island, hence facilitating communication and trade. French is widely used
in the administration and in high school instruction. When interviewed about the languages they
speak regularly, almost 50% of surveyed traders declare speaking a language other than
Malagasy on a regular basis -- usually French. Larger traders are slightly more likely to speak a
second language, but the difference is small. Although language is not as much a barrier to
exchange than it might be in other countries, regional differences and sensibilities exist and geo-
graphical mobility is limited.10 Most respondents trade within the area where they were born or
where they grew up. On average, only one trader out of twenty comes from outside the province
where he or she operates.
The family background of surveyed traders suggests that agricultural trade is an activity
undertaken mostly by mature, settled adults with a family and kids to provide for. Most surveyed
traders are married but a large part of the smaller traders are either bachelors, widow(er)s, or
divorced. The small trader category thus seems more heterogeneous, i.e., made of individuals
who are in the beginning of their career and of people that might have entered the sector because
of personal problems such as divorce or death in the family. Traders have three children on aver-
________________
9 The reader should bear in mind that Indo-Pakistani traders, who constitute a small minority of traders, tended to
refuse participation to the survey.
10 Although most Malagasy are from mixed Asian and African ancestry, people from coastal areas harbor a
historical resentment against people from the central highlands who traditionally ruled the country. Divisions also
exist along the lines of former kingdoms that historically divided the island. Remnants of pre-colonial caste
distinctions between members of the former royal family, the middle class, and former slaves are said to survive in
certain rural areas, but the survey made no attempt to revive these feudal classiﬁcations by asking questions about it.14 
age, half of whom are old enough to help with the business. Respondents also have brothers and
sisters who, if necessary, could assist in the ﬁrm. Parents education does not vary much across
ﬁrm sizes and thus appears an unlikely determining factor in trade success.
In terms of personal wealth, 56% of the surveyed traders own a house but only 5% have a
television and 23% a bicycle. 44% and 90 % of the traders possess a radio and a cassette
recorder, respectively. In all cases, the percentage is higher for bigger traders who also tend to
live in a more expensive home. The value of the house that traders live in is on average commen-
surate with the value of their working capital, hence suggesting that their business risk exposure
is far from negligible. Finally, there does not appear to be a strong relationship between geo-
graphical location and ﬁrm size (Table 4).
To summarize, Malagasy traders in agricultural food products are characterized by their
extreme diversity in terms of volume of operation and their unsophisticated mode of operation
(little equipment, few employees). In contrast with the common view that trade in Africa is
mostly a secondary activity, most surveyed traders are heavily involved in trade: they have
invested in it a large proportion of their total wealth and they derive a signiﬁcant proportion of
their income from it. Given the low level of technical sophistication of the industry as a whole
and the relative unimportance of credit, even for large traders, returns to scale are unlikely to be
present. As a result, one would expect entry to be easy and competition to be ﬁerce.
Some of the evidence presented above seems to support this view, in particular the plethora
of small traders, especially in retail, and the fact that small traders are younger and less esta-
blished but otherwise share a family background similar to that of successful traders, suggesting
a life-cycle explanation for size differences. Some of the facts, however, do not ﬁt a simple free
entry, life-cycle explanation for the size distribution of trading ﬁrms. Traders in the upper tercile
of the ﬁrm size distribution use 15 times more working capital and 2.2 times more labor but they
sell 44 times more and get 46 more gross margin than traders in the lower tercile. Without doing15 
any complex calculation, it is clear that large traders have a much higher total factor productivity
than small traders. What factors could explain this difference? Human capital has been put forth
in the recent literature as a major determinant of economic performance (e.g., Mankiw, Romer
and Weil (1992)). It is unlikely, however, that the very small difference in schooling observed
between small and large traders could account for the difference in total factor productivity.
Another possible candidate, one that is receiving increasing attention, is the social network capi-
tal of traders, that is, the relationships that they have with others. To explore this possibility, we
now investigate the many roles that relationships play in the business of Malagasy traders.
Section 4. Trade and Relationships
We begin with Table 5 which illustrates the importance of relationships as perceived by
traders themselves. The Table shows that relationships are by far the most important factor for
the success of a trader. 71% of the respondents regard reputation and relationships as very impor-
tant for the success of their business. This proportion is much higher than that for credit, price, or
equipment. Access to credit, which is typically presented as a major constraint by small
businesses the world over, ranks much lower than relationships: only 11% of the respondents see
it as a very important factor in business success; close to 40% of the respondents think it is not
important at all.
It is sometimes argued that relationships are important among the poor because they need
the support of their family and community to deal with the vagaries of life while the rich can
afford to behave in a more individualistic fashion (e.g., Platteau (1996)). This is not the case here.
Table 5 indeed also shows that the importance given to relationships rises with ﬁrm size: while
62% of small ﬁrms think relationships are very important, 77% of large traders do. It is therefore
not the case that the emphasis on relationships results from the presence in the sample of small,
poor traders who life in symbiosis with their community. If anything, larger, richer traders put
more emphasis on relationships than the poor, not less.16 
These results beg the question of why relationships are important. To try to answer this
question, we examine six possible roles that relationships may play in trade: (1) business training
and start-up support; (2) information sharing; (3) regularity of demand and supply; (4) credit; (5)
prevention of contractual breaches; and (6) risk sharing.
Business training and start-up support
Table 6 shows that a quarter of surveyed traders had either a father or a mother in trade.
Only 14% of respondents say they are in this business because of family traditions, however.
Half the traders were helped by family and friends at start-up and close to half learned the busi-
ness with a relative or a friend. The rest learned business on their own. Larger traders seem to
have had parents with more experience in trade but otherwise are similar to their smaller counter-
parts: if anything, they are more likely to indicate they learned the business on their own -- a
ﬁnding hardly consistent with the idea that parents in trade is a condition for success. In addition,
the bottom of the Table shows that traders have typically outgrown their family base: while on
average they have about one relative in trade, they know close to 10 traders personally. Taken
together, this evidence suggests that while, for some traders, family relationships were important
at start-up for capital and experience, they do not seem to be strong determinants of business suc-
cess. If anything, traders who learned the business from their family appear less likely to be suc-
cessful. In contrast, non-family types of relationships which are initially unimportant seem to
grow over time.
Information sharing
In contrast with training and start-up support, non-family relationships appear critical for
getting access to business-relevant information. Table 7 lists the sources of information on prices,
supply, and demand conditions used by surveyed traders. The numbers bring to light the
paramount importance of relationships as sources of information: other traders and suppliers and17 
clients are by far the most important source of business information. Public sources such as news-
papers, radio, and public services play an extremely marginal role. Larger traders rely more than
small traders on messengers, that is, individuals who are sent explicitly to collect information,
but even among large traders their role is dwarfed by relationships. Another interesting regularity
present in the data is that small traders are more likely than large traders to seek information from
other traders instead of getting information from suppliers and clients. One likely explanation is
that large traders have a closer relationship with their suppliers and clients and feel they can rely
on the information they provide. Small traders, in contrast, probably fear they will be cheated if
they trust what suppliers and clients tell them.
The frequency with which respondents share information with other traders appears fairly
low, however, as shown in Table 8. While more respondents discuss quality, bad clients, and
prices with others at least once a year, the great majority of them do not discuss these issues
every week.11
Regularity of supply and demand
Another possible role that relationships play is in ensuring secure supply and demand. Sur-
vey results indicate that ﬁnding a supplier or a client is a recurrent problem for respondents:
between 40 and 50% of them occasionally face difﬁculties identifying potential buyers and sell-
ers. As Table 9 illustrates, traders who experience lots of difﬁculties are those who have the smal-
lest numbers of regular suppliers and clients. In other words, traders with regular sources of sup-
ply and demand are less likely to encounter problems. Relationships thus reduce search costs.
Table 10 indicates the existence of a strong relationship between ﬁrm size and the emphasis
on regular suppliers and clients: while large ﬁrms do between 40 and 45% of their business with
________________
11 Some caution should be used when interpreting the results, however. First, respondents seem to have understood
the questions relative to ’other traders’ as meaning ’other traders who operate in a manner similar to yours’, hence
excluding suppliers and clients even if they are traders. Second, questions relative to bad clients and prices were only
asked to respondents who have regular clients, thereby introducing a potential bias.18 
regulars, this proportion is much smaller among small traders. As a result, larger traders econom-
ize on search costs relative to smaller traders and probably have more secure sources of demand
and supply. Results indicates that the ties respondents have with their regular suppliers and
clients is not based on family or ethnicity: the overwhelming majority of them (90%) describe
their ties as business only. This is not entirely surprising given that Madagascar, unlike other
developing countries (e.g., Fafchamps (1998)), shares a single language and sense of ethnic
homogeneity.12 The emphasis that larger traders place on regular clients and suppliers is con-
sistent with their use of suppliers and clients as sources of information about prices and market
conditions: the existence of long term relationships between them ensure that the information
provided is more accurate that what would be conveyed to an unknown trader.
Trade Credit
Another reason why traders might value relationships is because they open access to trade
credit in the form of payment facilities with suppliers or advances paid by customers. Table 11
reports the proportion of purchases and sales made cash, on credit, and with advance payment.
The overwhelming majority of transactions are cash only. On average, respondents operate one
sixth of their business with some element of credit. When credit is present, it ﬂoats predom-
inantly downstream, that is, from seller to buyer. The ratio of payables and receivables over
monthly sales shows that respondents are, on average, net givers of credit, not so much because
they sell more on credit than they buy -- on the contrary -- but probably because buyers take
more time to pay.
Relationships play an important role in access to trade credit. Results shows that respon-
dents virtually never grant or receive trade credit on the ﬁrst transaction. The role of relation-
________________
12 Although Malagasy people do not distinguish themselves according to language or ethnicity, they do pay
attention to geographical origin, however. Unfortunately, no questions were asked about the geographical origin of
regular clients and suppliers.19 
ships in trade credit is further conﬁrmed by the likely consequences of default. Table 12 shows
that, if a respondent were to not pay a supplier, the credit of the respondent with other suppliers
would not be affected very much: half of them estimated that not paying would only reduce their
chances of getting trade credit with none or at most some of their suppliers. Similar responses
were obtained when the question was asked about the respondent’s clients. Taken together, these
ﬁgures suggest that the reputational sanctions for breach of contract are mild (e.g., Kandori
(1992), Fafchamps (1998a), Greif (1993, 1994)). The loss of the relationship, however, is valu-
able: as shown in Table 13, the large majority of respondents feel that it would be difﬁcult for
them to ﬁnd a new supplier if they were to lose one -- as would most probably be the case if they
failed to pay. These ﬁndings are similar to those described by Fafchamps (1996) in the case of
Ghana, and they are consistent with theoretical models of trade that emphasize the self-
disciplining role of relationships (e.g., Ghosh and Ray (1996), Fafchamps (1998a, 1998b)).
Breaches of Contracts and Conﬂict Resolution
Further evidence in favor of the relationship-based models of trade can be found in the
manner respondents prevent breaches of contract and handle contractual conﬂicts. Table 14
presents estimates of the absolute and relative frequencies of contractual disputes among sur-
veyed traders. The evidence shows that the incidence of problems is very high. On average,
respondents face a quality or late delivery problem in 1 out of every 13 purchases and a late or
non-payment problem in 1 out of every 45 sales. These averages, however, hide the fact that the
frequency of problems is much higher among ﬁrms that contract forward. Among ﬁrms that
place orders, for instance, a problem with supplies occurs on average in one third of the pur-
chases; the proportion is even higher for large traders (Table 14). Among ﬁrms that sell on credit,
a case of late or non-payment arises in one out of every 20 sales. Since these ﬁrms do not sell all
their output on credit, this translates into one case of late or non payment in 20% of the credit
sales. Fortunately, only one out of every 35 late payment cases turns into non-payment.20 
Evidence collected in Ghana by Fafchamps (1996) suggests that what probably keeps this pro-
portion low is the time traders spend chasing late payers. To summarize, the incidence of con-
tractual problems is high whenever traders contract forward, which explains why few of them do.
Traders’ desire to avoid the contractual problems created by forward contracting singularly
complicates exchange and is achieved at considerable cost. First of all, as the Table itself shows,
most transactions take place without orders and without credit. This means that virtually all trade
in agricultural products in the entire island of Madagascar takes the form of cash-and-carry tran-
sactions. This can hardly be regarded as an efﬁcient and convenient way of conducting trade.
Very little if any forward looking transactions occur, and if they do, they are based on a strong
relationship of trust between buyer and seller. Since traders hardly ever pay by check,13 this
implies that search costs are higher than they should be, and that massive amounts of currency
constantly circulate in the countryside -- an invitation to theft and a perfect target for an inﬂation
tax. Not surprisingly, many surveyed traders identify security as their number one problem (e.g.,
IFPRI (1998)).
The prevention of problems also has its costs. Table 15 indicates that the overwhelming
majority of traders and their clients inspect quality before purchasing. In other words, quality is
inspected visually each time a product changes hands.14 Given the multi-layered nature of agri-
cultural trade and thus the large number of transactions involved in getting foodstuffs from pro-
ducers to consumers, we see that inspecting quality alone must account for a signiﬁcant propor-
tion of the spread between producer and consumer food prices.
The Table also demonstrates that quality inspection is a task that traders hardly ever
delegate: although they employ on average 3.3 people to assist with the business, traders nearly
________________
13 The fact that Malagasy banks -- according to what we have heard -- take two to four weeks to clear checks
drawn on another town hardly incite traders to pay by check: doing so would tie up their working capital for weeks on
end.
14 Similar practices are described in Ethiopia by Gabre-Madhin (1997).21 
always inspect quality themselves, presumably because conducting the task accurately is critical
for business. In other words, so few cases of bad deliveries are reported not because suppliers are
truthful but because buyers go to great lengths to ensure they are not cheated. Given the amount
of energy they spend on checking quality, it is surprising that bad deliveries occur at all. Traders’
inability or unwillingness to delegate quality inspection also means that their volume of activity
is limited by the quantities that the owner can inspect in person. It also implies numerous trips to
supply areas, some of which are for nothing since traders do not use telephones, cannot or will
not place or take orders, and and must search for buyers or sellers once they are on location. Such
a system can be but expensive to run and in such an environment having close relationships with
regular clients and suppliers must singularly simplify one’s business -- hence the emphasis put on
relationships as a factor of commercial success.
Similar difﬁculties arise in the granting of trade credit. Table 16 shows that the great major-
ity of respondents check the credibility of clients before granting payment facilities. Apart from
information collected from the client directly or from a personal visit to the client’s shop, respon-
dents rely primarily on information received from traders and other sources such as friends and
family. There too relationships serve a role as facilitator of the screening of trade credit reci-
pients. The relatively small proportion of respondents who cite information collected from
traders and other sources and the fact that this proportion diminishes with ﬁrm size nevertheless
suggest that reputation mechanisms in agricultural trade in Madagascar can be described as
embryonic at best. This stands in stark contrast with the intense sharing of information -- and the
much higher incidence of trade credit -- that were found by one of the authors in Kenya and Zim-
babwe (e.g., Fafchamps et al. (1994), Fafchamps, Pender and Robinson (1995), Fafchamps
(1997), Fafchamps (1998b)). There, ﬁrms were found to actively share information about bad
payers, either informally (Kenya) or via a credit reference bureau (Zimbabwe). The vetting of
clients was also widely practiced. Agricultural trade in Madagascar more closely resembles the22 
manufacturing sector in Ghana where little information sharing was uncovered (e.g., Fafchamps
(1996)).
The reader may wonder why breach of contract is not efﬁciently deterred by the presence of
legal institutions such as lawyers, courts, and the police. Table 17 indicates the conﬂict resolution
methods most likely to be used after a breach of contract. By far the dominant response is to
negotiate with the other party and, in some cases, to call upon a third party to serve as mediator.
The use of lawyers is extremely rare (only one case was recorded). Respondents are even
extremely reluctant to use the threat of calling the policy or going to court, let alone actually
doing it. Again, these results are similar to those observed elsewhere (e.g., Fafchamps (1996),
Bigsten et al. (1998)) though they demonstrate an even lower reliance on legal institutions than
elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. Not using legal institutions does not mean that conﬂicts are not
resolved, however. In fact, four ﬁfths of disputes with suppliers and clients are resolved and trade
resumed. This brings out yet another function that relationships play: to facilitate the resolution
of conﬂicts through negotiation. It is because parties wish to preserve their relationship that they
agree to negotiate and to seek a mutually agreeable solution to their dispute, a solution that
preserves the relationship itself. In other words, it is because traders value relationships that con-
tractual disputes are resolved.
Risk Sharing
Relationships can also serve the role of insurance mechanism. Business in general and
trade in particular are subject to all kinds of risks -- theft, non or late payment, adverse price
ﬂuctuation, storage loss, etc -- each of which can easily cripple a small trading business. In a
world where trade credit is inexistent or rare, a trader without working capital cannot operate.
Consequently, a trader whose working capital is either lost or tied up in bad debt and unsold
stocks loses his or her income. The capacity to borrow from others therefore serves a crucial
insurance purpose. Table 18 conﬁrms that the overwhelming majority of respondents are23 
involved in helping and being helped by others. Assisting and being assisted can be interpreted
as the two sides of the same coin: people help each other because they expect to be helped in
return (e.g., Fafchamps (1992), Coate and Ravallion (1993), Lund and Fafchamps (1997)).
Interestingly, the Table shows that larger traders are as involved in solidarity networks as their
smaller competitors, and that they have in general more friends they can count on in times of
trouble. This ﬂies into the face of those who have claimed that solidarity mechanisms tax the rich
and that, as a result, the rich are more individualistic (e.g., Platteau (1996)).
To investigate these ideas further, respondents were asked to rank a variety of statements
about poverty, prosperity, and mutual assistance on a scale going from very true to very false.
Results are summarized in Figures 1 to 9. The ﬁrst two Figures presents respondents’ attitudes
toward poverty. Not surprisingly, the poor are less likely than the rich to blame laziness for
poverty, but contrary to expectations they do not see poverty as the outcome of lack of assistance
either. Small traders are more likely to declare that they have put money aside for difﬁcult times
and less likely to sell everything in bad times (Figures 3 and 4). In contrast, small traders are less
likely to help others in need (Figure 5) and, in counterpart, less likely than large and medium size
traders to receive assistance in times of trouble (Figure 6). If anyone is afraid that prosperity will
be taxed away by family and friends, it is the poor: Figure 7 shows that small traders are sys-
tematically more likely to believe their family will invite themselves to their home if they
succeed in trade. Consequently, small traders are more likely to derive individualistic pride in
their business accomplishment (Figure 8). Individualism thus appears more present among small
traders than among large ones. As for investment disincentives (Figure 9), they do not appear to
be present either: small traders are systematically less likely to invest their proﬁts in business
than medium and large size traders -- possibly because they have less access to social insurance
through solidarity networks.
To summarize, large traders appear less individualistic and more prepared than small24 
traders to help others and get helped in return. The capacity to successfully join networks of soli-
darity may well be critical to their long term prosperity as it shelters them from some of the risks
of business and enable them to invest more, grow more rapidly. In addition, solidarity relation-
ships probably enable traders to borrow money not so much to deal with negative shocks but to
take advantage of especially lucrative arbitrage opportunities.
Conclusion
We have investigated the role that relationships play in the conduct of agricultural trading
businesses. We found that relationships play a wide variety of roles such as: (1) business training
and start-up support; (2) information sharing; (3) regularity of demand and supply; (4) credit; (5)
prevention of contractual breaches; and (6) risk sharing. Of these, the regularity of supply and
demand and risk sharing appear particularly important in the sense that large traders enjoy a
signiﬁcantly larger proportion of sales and purchases from regular partners and systematically
emphasize values and action consistent with risk sharing. Together with the circulation of infor-
mation, the capacity and willingness to get and give trade credit, place and take orders, and sim-
plify the inspection of quality are additional beneﬁts traders derive from good relationships. The
value of relationships, not legal institutions, appears to be what motivates traders to honor con-
tracts and seek the resolution of conﬂicts through negotiation. These issues are analyzed in
further detail in Fafchamps and Minten (1998).
The importance of relationships is partly due to the extreme lack of sophistication in busi-
ness practices: no payment by check; no invoicing; very little trade credit and placement of ord-
ers; visual inspection of quality by the trader or a trusted associate at each transaction; screening
of clients through visual inspection of their shop and repeated interaction; and little or no evi-
dence of reputation mechanisms to punish opportunistic breaches of contract. More than a
decade after the initiation of market reform in Madagascar, these ﬁndings are disturbing and
serve as a sobering reminder that, without development of supporting institutions, the free market25 
remains nothing but a ﬂea market. What precise institutions are required is not immediately clear
from this work, but results suggest two possible lines of attack. One approach consists in foster-
ing the faster and more widespread accumulation of social capital. This could, for instance, be
achieved by facilitating interaction and trust among traders, for instance by establishing a
Chamber of Commerce or by developing of informal clubs and other brotherhoods.15 A second
approach would be to limit the need for social capital by reducing market imperfections, e.g., by
setting up institutions that facilitate payments (e.g., faster check clearing), expedite inspection of
quality (e.g., grading), reduce insecurity (e.g., police), circulate information (e.g., radio programs,
credit reference bureau), penalize cheaters (e.g., pursue fraud), or reduce risk (e.g., bank line of
credit, futures market).
The results presented here suggest that successful traders owe their success not to individu-
alism but to relationships. If anything, the evidence indicates that it is those who can create and
nurture relationships who prosper as traders. Perhaps this is not original. After all, in the popular
psyche, the trader is often portrayed as someone who is jovial and relates well with others. But
the role of relationships is often overlooked in standard economic models that emphasize the
maximization of proﬁt through the accumulation of capital and the command of labor. There is
also a social dimension to success, one that relies on the accumulation of valuable business rela-
tionships, of social network capital. Among traders, this accumulation process is one’s passport
to prosperity because it gives better access to information and risk sharing and it reduces the
costs of search, quality control, and contract enforcement.
________________
15 See, for instance, the description of the role that brotherhoods play in building up social capital among traders
in Geertz, Geertz, and Rosen (1979). The problem with brotherhoods is that they may restrict entry and favor their
members at the expense of outsiders (e.g., Taylor (1997), Fafchamps (1998)).26 
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Size (1):
% Total % Large % Medium % Small Occupation:
10.4% 75 21.4% 52 8.7% 22 0.4% 1 Assemblers
19.9% 144 32.5% 79 15.4% 39 11.5% 26 Wholesalers
11.3% 82 15.2% 37 12.6% 32 5.7% 13 Semi-wholesalers
45.4% 329 29.6% 72 53.9% 137 52.9% 120 Retailers with a fixed selling point
13.0% 94 1.2% 3 9.4% 24 29.5% 67 Retailers without fixed selling point
724 243 254 227 Total
(1) Size categories are based on total sales.Table 2. Size of Operation and Gross Margin
All figures given in US$.  All figures subject to considerable measurement error.
No. of Gini  Firm size:
observ. coef. Total Large Medium Small 1. Size of operation
724 0.761 3278 8635 908 196 Value of monthly sales 3/96-3/97
717 0.747 2812 6896 1198 173 Value of monthly purchases 3/96-3/97
739 0.750 1254 2421 904 395 Value of monthly sales 10/97
739 0.748 1037 2015 740 321 Value of monthly purchases 10/97
2. Margin
685 0.702 463 1198 193 26 Gross margin per month
14.1% 13.9% 21.3% 13.4% Margin rate = gross margin/sales (1)
(1) Computed as average gross margin/average sales.Table 3. Capital and Manpower
No. of Size:
observ. Total Large Medium Small 1. Capital and equipment
714 2061 4949 829 331 Working capital in $
727 11.0% 12.4% 13.8% 5.7% % with outside funding
547 43.4% 36.0% 31.2% 66.0% mean Opportunity cost of funds
547 20.0% 30.0% 20.0% 20.0% median              in percent per year (1):
724 26.2 62.9 9.5 5.1 Storage capacity in MT
739 399 885 169 26 Equipment value in $
739 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 No. of vehicles
2. Communication
729 5.1% 11.5% 2.0% 1.8% % with telephone
729 56.5% 58.0% 52.4% 59.0% % with access to telephone
729 16.2% 32.9% 7.1% 8.8% % using telephone
729 0.5% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% % with fax machine
729 21.8% 35.8% 18.9% 10.6% % with access to fax
729 0.8% 2.0% 0.0% 0.4% % using fax machine
3. Management
726 6.1 7.6 5.9 4.7 Year since business has started
739 87.3% 87.2% 93.7% 85.0% % Full time traders
729 83.4% 84.0% 85.8% 80.6% % All year traders
4. Manpower
729 1.0 1.4 1.1 0.6 No. unpaid family help
729 1.0 2.3 0.4 0.2 No. permanent employees
729 1.3 3.1 0.5 0.2 No. temporary employees
729 4.3 7.8 3.0 2.0 Total manpower (2)
729 11.0 11.2 11.1 10.7 Months of owner's time
729 10.9 14.6 11.8 6.0 Months of family help's time
729 11.3 27.5 4.3 1.8 Months of permanent empl.
729 7.3 19.3 1.9 0.6 Months of temporary empl.
729 40.5 72.7 29.1 19.1 Total months
739 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 No. of collectors
(1) Obtained from the answer to the question "How much could you pay back in 6 months if
you could borrow [the equivalent of US$20]?" and expressed in percent per year.
(2) Owner/manager counted as 1.Table 4. Human Capital, Family Background, Wealth, and Location
No. of Size:
observ. Total Large Medium Small 1. Characteristics of owner
711 45.7% 32.4% 47.0% 59.3% % Female owners
709 37.6 40.1 36.9 35.6 Age
735 9.1 10.1 8.8 8.1 Years of schooling
711 9.1% 4.6% 6.8% 16.7% % Non-christian
739 1.2% 2.5% 0.4% 0.9% % Foreign
729 1.47 1.62 1.42 1.35 No. of languages spoken
2. Family of owner
739 76.7% 87.2% 80.3% 65.6% % Married
711 3.3 3.6 3.2 3.0 No. of children
739 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 No. sons aged 15 & above
739 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 No. daughters aged 15 & above
739 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.5 No. brothers aged 15 & above
739 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 No. sisters aged 15 & above
576 3.0 3.4 2.9 2.8 Years of schooling of father
576 2.6 2.9 2.4 2.4 Years of schooling of mother
3. Wealth
739 56% 61% 45% 61% % who own house
739 1980 3666 1295 894 Value of house in $
739 5% 12% 1% 3% % who own pers. vehicle
4. Location
739 16% 14% 21% 12% % who operate in capital city
739 31% 36% 29% 31% % who operate in other city
739 53% 50% 50% 57% % who operate in rural areas
732 18% 18% 23% 12% % who operate in Tana/Hauts Plateaux
732 20% 26% 25% 9% % who operate in Vakinantaratra
732 25% 33% 17% 26% % who operate in Fianar/Hauts Plateaux
732 11% 10% 15% 9% % who operate in Fianar/Cote et falaise
732 12% 6% 13% 17% % who operate in Majunga/Plaine
732 13% 7% 7% 28% % who operate in Majunga/Hauts PlateauxTable 5. Factors Important for Success As Perceived by Traders
To facilitate comparison, cumulative percentages of answers are reported
Size:
Total Large Medium Small
A. Personal reputation and relationships
5% 3% 6% 7% Not important
15% 9% 19% 17% A little important
29% 23% 27% 38% Important
100% 100% 100% 100% Very important
B. Access to Credit
39% 28% 28% 64% Not important
70% 65% 63% 84% A little important
89% 83% 89% 96% Important
100% 100% 100% 100% Very important
C. Granting Credit
50% 40% 46% 63% Not important
82% 75% 82% 90% A little important
97% 94% 98% 98% Important
100% 100% 100% 100% Very important
D. Purchase Price
5% 5% 2% 7% Not important
26% 33% 19% 27% A little important
70% 72% 67% 72% Important
100% 100% 100% 100% Very important
E. Sale Price
2% 1% 1% 1% Not important
17% 18% 11% 21% A little important
65% 63% 59% 72% Important
100% 100% 100% 100% Very important
F. Transport Equipment
32% 27% 31% 37% Not important
49% 46% 44% 56% A little important
73% 68% 69% 84% Important
100% 100% 100% 100% Very important
729 243 254 227 No. observationsTable 6. Family and Business
Size:
Total Large Medium Small A. Family in Trade
25.8% 26.3% 24.0% 27.8% % with parent in trade
4.1 5.1 3.8 3.4 No. years father in trade
4.1 5.1 3.3 4.1 No. years mother in trade
18.0% 17.7% 14.2% 22.9% % with parent in agricultural trade
2.6 4.0 1.9 2.2 No. years father in agr. trade
2.8 4.0 1.8 2.7 No. years mother in agr. trade
B. Help at Startup
53.2% 56.8% 48.8% 54.2% % helped at startup by family/friends
30.7% 25.1% 27.2% 39.2% Learned working with parents/relative
14.8% 14.0% 15.8% 15.4% Learned working with friend/partner
2.2% 2.9% 1.2% 0.9% Learned as employee of trader
52.2% 58.0% 55.9% 44.5% Learned alone
C. Contacts
1.9 2.1 1.7 1.8 No. relatives with wage job
0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 No. relatives in trade
0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 No. relatives in agricultural trade
8.8 10.0 10.3 6.3 No. traders known personally
739 243 254 227 Number of observationsTable 7. Sources of Information on Market Conditions
Table reports the main source of information on the following:
Firm size:
Total Large Medium Small A. Prices:
59.9% 39.9% 60.6% 81.1% Other traders
28.3% 37.4% 31.1% 15.0% Suppliers and clients
11.5% 22.6% 7.9% 3.5% Messengers
0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% Public sources
B. Supply conditions:
23.2% 18.9% 19.7% 32.2% Other traders
70.2% 68.3% 76.4% 64.8% Suppliers and clients
5.9% 12.3% 3.5% 1.8% Messengers
0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 1.3% Public sources
C. Demand conditions:
16.5% 10.3% 10.6% 30.0% Other traders
77.5% 79.0% 85.8% 67.8% Suppliers and clients
3.7% 8.6% 1.6% 0.9% Messengers
2.3% 2.1% 2.0% 1.3% Public sources
729 243 254 227 Number of observationsTable 8. Information Sharing
To facilitate comparison, cumulative percentages of answers are reported.
No. of Size:
observ. Total Large Medium Small
1. Discuss product quality with other traders:
725 2% 2% 2% 2% At least once a day
725 13% 8% 11% 19% At least once a week
725 25% 20% 27% 28% At least once a month
725 78% 73% 73% 87% At least once a year
725 100% 100% 100% 100% Never
2. Discuss bad paying clients with other traders (1):
339 1% 2% 1% 0% At least once a day
339 3% 4% 3% 0% At least once a week
339 13% 14% 18% 2% At least once a month
339 77% 79% 71% 81% At least once a year
339 100% 100% 100% 100% Never
3. Discuss prices with other traders (1):
339 4% 4% 3% 2% At least once a day
339 18% 14% 16% 40% At least once a week
339 32% 28% 31% 47% At least once a month
339 80% 80% 76% 87% At least once a year
339 100% 100% 100% 100% Never
(1) Asked to traders with regular clients only.Table 9. Presence of Regular Partners and Ease of Search
Ever fail to find a supplier:
Total Often Occas. Never Regular suppliers:
51.2% 42.9% 59.8% 49.0% % with regular suppliers
3.6 1.5 3.3 4.4 No. of regular suppliers
729 84 241 404 Number of observations
100.0% 11.5% 33.1% 55.4% Percentage of sample
Ever fail to find a client:
Total Often Occas. Never Regular clients:
71.2% 47.0% 75.0% 76.0% % with regular clients
5.8 2.8 5.9 6.5 No. of regular clients
729 116 162 451 Number of observations
100.0% 15.9% 22.2% 61.9% Percentage of sampleTable 10. Regular Suppliers and Clients
Size:
Total Large Medium Small
A. Regular suppliers:
51.2% 62.6% 59.4% 33.0% % with regular suppliers
3.6 6.2 3.4 1.4 No. of regular suppliers
36.7% 45.6% 42.9% 22.8% % purchases from regular suppliers
4.1 4.7 4.1 3.1 No. years known reg. suppliers (1)
B. Regular clients:
71.2% 88.9% 71.3% 52.0% % with regular clients
5.8 8.3 5.8 3.0 No. of regular clients
26.8% 39.9% 26.1% 13.3% % purchases to regulars
3.8 4.2 4.0 2.3 No. years known reg. clients (2)
(1) Computed for the respondents with regular suppliers only.
(2) Computed for the respondents with regular clients only.Table 11. Trade Credit
Size:
Total Large Medium Small A. Credit from and to suppliers:
82.3% 79.4% 76.9% 90.8% % purchases cash
15.8% 17.2% 21.1% 9.1% % purchases on credit
1.8% 3.3% 2.0% 0.1% % purchases advance payment
6.2% 5.7% 7.7% 2.7% ratio payables/monthly sales
B. Credit to and from clients:
85.8% 76.4% 86.1% 94.8% % sales cash
13.6% 22.4% 13.3% 5.2% % sales on credit
0.6% 1.2% 0.7% 0.0% % sales advance payment
11.6% 16.1% 9.8% 6.6% ratio receivables/monthly sales
739 243 254 227 Number of observationsTable 12. Loss of Trade Credit in Case of Non-Payment
Non-payment
by client to supplier
21% 11% No loss of supplier credit
59% 40% Loss of credit from some other suppliers
15% 31% Loss of credit from most other suppliers
5% 17% Loss of credit from all other suppliers
344 194 No. observations (1)
(1) Computed for the respondents with regular suppliers only.Table 13. Difficulty of Finding Suppliers If Lose One
Size:
Total Large Medium Small
8% 10% 8% 6% Very easy
16% 20% 18% 3% Fairly easy
44% 41% 43% 56% Fairly difficult
31% 30% 31% 36% Very difficult
194 71 87 36 Number of observations
Computed for the respondents with regular suppliers only.Table 14. Frequency of Contractual Problems
Size:
Total Large Medium Small 1. With suppliers:
7.8 11.5 5.5 6.5 No. transactions per month
0.28 0.48 0.30 0.07 No. cases deficient quality per month
0.07 0.10 0.08 0.03 No. cases late deliveries per month
14.8% 19.2% 17.8% 7.4% % traders who place orders
Average incidence of problems:
31.7% 40.7% 28.3% 17.8% Among firms that place orders
3.5% 3.9% 4.4% 2.4% Among firms that do not place orders
7.7% 10.7% 8.3% 3.6% Over all firms
2. With clients:
323 261 325 386 No. transactions per month
0.68 1.12 0.77 0.14 No. cases of late payment per month
0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 No. cases of non payment per month
13.6% 22.4% 13.3% 5.2% % sales on credit
Average incidence of problems:
4.5% 5.4% 4.5% 2.1% Among firms that sell on credit
0.3% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% Among firms that do not sell on credit
2.2% 3.7% 2.3% 0.7% Over all firmsTable 15. Verification of Quality of Products
Size:
Total Large Medium Small 1. Quality inspection by respondent
84% 78% 83% 92% % always inspect quality before purchas
94% 89% 93% 99% % owner inspects quality
5% 6% 7% 0% % family helper inspects quality
2% 5% 0% 0% % employee or agent inspects quality
2. Quality inspection by clients
86% 82% 86% 90% % client always inspect quality
3. Action taken by respondent if supplies are of bad quality:
55% 46% 49% 69% None/quality is the buyer's problem
28% 36% 31% 18% Supplier provides a refund/replacement
17% 19% 21% 13% Other
4. Action taken by client if supplies are of bad quality:
62% 52% 58% 77% None/quality is the buyer's problem
21% 26% 25% 13% Supplier provides a refund/replacement
17% 22% 17% 10% OtherTable 16. Credibility of Clients
Questions were asked only to respondents who ever grant credit to clients.
Size:
Total Large Medium Small
1. Respondent verifies credibility of client before sale (1):
6% 5% 7% 6% Never
9% 9% 9% 8% Seldom
29% 30% 24% 38% Sometimes
47% 46% 37% 72% Often
100% 100% 100% 100% Always
2. Sources of information consulted before granting credit:
96% 94% 97% 98% % get information from client directly
27% 33% 28% 9% % visit client's shop
24% 25% 15% 38% % obtain information from other traders
1% 2% 0% 2% % get information from client's bank
12% 8% 11% 23% % get information from other sources
(1) Cumulative percentages reported to facilitate comparison.Table 17. Conflict Resolution Method
Client Supplier
1. Conflict resolution method
93.6% 91.3% Direct negotiation
9.1% 3.8% Mediator
0.5% 0.0% Lawyer
3.6% 0.0% Threat going to police
0.9% 0.4% Threat going to court
2. Outcome of conflict
80.9% 81.3% Problem resolved
75.0% 87.5% Still trading with party
220 160 Number of observationsTable 18. Risk Sharing and Access to Financial Help
Size:
Total Large Medium Small
76.3% 80.2% 77.2% 72.2% % who has ever helped others
75.0% 74.5% 75.6% 76.2% % who has ever been helped by others
2.3 2.7 2.5 1.7 No. people who can help







































































































































































LargeFigure 9: "If I had a lot of money, I would invest it in business"
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